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Abstract
Past sociological inequality research focused on (labor) market outcomes, while
neglecting the even more important role of wealth. In our study we investigate
the distribution of wealth among the elderly across Europe within the frame-
work of Esping-Andersen’s typology of welfare states. Using SHARE data, our
analyses suggest (1) that there is strong variation in the distribution of wealth
between European countries, and (2) that patterns of wealth inequality differ
strongly from patterns of income inequality. Surprisingly high levels of wealth
disparity were found in the social democratic welfare regimes commonly known
as very egalitarian societies. We conclude that Esping-Andersen’s scheme re-
quires reconsideration because it is based on a one-sided understanding of social
stratification not accounting for the central role of wealth in the stratification
process.
Keywords: Inequality, wealth, net worth, income, SHARE, Gini, stratification,
welfare state, Europe.
1Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the ECSR conference, Analysing Educa-
tion, Family, Work and Welfare in Modern Societies , Bamberg, September 30 - October 2,
2010 and at the 6th Annual Graduate Conference in Political Science, International Relations
and Public Policy, Jerusalem, December 15-17, 2010. We are indebted to the audiences for
their helpful comments, especially to Michael Shalev, Moshe Semyonov, Noah Lewin-Epstein,
Assaf Rotman, Jan Skopek, and Thomas Leopold. We also thank the German-Israeli Foun-
dation for funding our research project on “International Comparison of Household Wealth
Inequalities” that enabled us to develop this paper.
1 Introduction
Ever since the beginning of sociology, describing social inequalities, explain-
ing how they come into being, and elaborating their impact on individual life
chances, class identification, and political behavior have been core subjects
(Grusky, 2008). In recent years, international comparative research on social
inequality has shown that modern societies exhibit very different and distinct
patterns of inequality, and that its level and persistence depend strongly on
national institutional settings. The work of Esping-Andersen Esping-Andersen
(1990, 1999) has had a particularly strong influence on today’s understanding
of how country-specific institutions – above all, the level of public commitment
to equal opportunities through elaborated welfare arrangements and concepts
of social solidarity – shape social inequality structures. In this respect, past
research has shown that the so-called social democratic welfare regimes of Scan-
dinavia seem to be especially effective in reducing social inequalities by prior-
itizing publicly supported (full) employment, high taxation of incomes, and a
comparatively high level of decommodification2 for those who are not employed.
Nevertheless, a major drawback of this research is that social inequality and
stratification are mainly analyzed by studying labor market processes (e.g., la-
bor market access, level of integration into full employment, job mobility, social
transfers) and income distributions (flow data). Such flow data are relevant
in order to understand how the organization of work and welfare in a society
is related to social class. More recently, some scholars (e. g. Spilerman, 2000)
have stressed that social inequality research should also consider wealth because
income is only one dimension of individuals’ socio-economic position. Further-
more, studies only addressing income or labor market inequalities may paint
a one-sided and even inaccurate picture of social inequalities. Indeed, diverse
studies (e. g. Brzozowski et al., 2010; Jäntti, 2006; Keister and Moeller, 2000;
Schlomann, 1992) show that the correlation between income and wealth is much
weaker than one might expect, and that wealth inequality exceeds income in-
equality.
Studying wealth becomes even more relevant when we consider how inter-
generational transfers serve as powerful social mechanisms that reproduce and
intensify already existing social inequalities. Moreover, given the aging of in-
dustrialized societies along with the growing importance of private savings in
the course of the most recent pension reforms all over Europe (European Com-
mission, 2010) wealth will probably become an even more important source of
individuals’ well-being in modern societies, especially as an income substitute
2“De-commodification occurs when a service is rendered as a matter of right and when a
person can maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market” (Esping-Andersen, 1990,
p. 21f.).
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during the increasingly long phase of retirement due to growing life expectancy.
The aim of this article is to study (1) household wealth inequality compared
to income inequality in European countries and (2) the relationship between
wealth inequalities and welfare regimes. It is an open question whether differ-
ent welfare regimes interact with specific patterns of wealth inequalities, and
whether these patterns are similar or at least comparable to the social inequal-
ities arising from the labor market. If we find empirical evidence that income
and wealth inequality structures in a country do not follow the same pattern,
then our current typologies of welfare regimes will need to be reconsidered.
Up till now, our knowledge of wealth inequalities and their differences among
European countries is very limited, mainly because of a lack of high-quality
and internationally comparable data. However, new data from the “Survey of
Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe”(SHARE)3 enable us to study wealth
inequalities from a comparative perspective. SHARE is a longitudinal dataset
from a representative sample of people aged 50 years and older. We draw on the
second wave covering 13 European countries. With its strong harmonization of
measures across countries, we believe that SHARE provides an excellent data
base for an international comparison of wealth inequalities.
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the why and how
of studying wealth inequalities. Section 3 contains our theoretical considerations
and hypotheses. Data and methods are described in section 4; and in section
5 we present our empirical analyses and results. Finally, in section 6 we give a
short summary and outlook.
2 Why and how to study wealth inequalities
Most social inequality research has studied inequalities by analyzing all kinds of
outcomes of the labor market, such as income. However, in contrast to earned
income that demands time investments, efforts, and working ability from indi-
viduals, wealth offers access to capital and goods independently of individual
investments and abilities (Elmelech, 2008). Undoubtedly, earnings constitute
a major mechanism in the accumulation of wealth through saving (Ring, 2000,
p. 35) – indicating that earned income and wealth are closely interrelated.
3This paper uses data from SHARE release 2.5.0, as of May 24th 2011. The SHARE data
collection has been primarily funded by the European Commission through the 5th frame-
work programme (project QLK6-CT-2001- 00360 in the thematic programme Quality of Life),
through the 6th framework programme (projects SHARE-I3, RII-CT- 2006-062193, COM-
PARE, CIT5-CT-2005-028857, and SHARELIFE, CIT4-CT-2006-028812) and through the
7th framework programme (SHARE-PREP, 211909 and SHARE-LEAP, 227822). Additional
funding from the U.S. National Institute on Aging (U01 AG09740-13S2, P01 AG005842, P01
AG08291, P30 AG12815, Y1-AG-4553-01 and OGHA 04-064, IAG BSR06-11, R21 AG025169)
as well as by various national sources is gratefully acknowledged (see http://www.share-
project.org for a full list of funding institutions).
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Nonetheless, their empirical relationship might be much weaker than one might
expect at first glance. For example, Schlomann (1992) found a correlation be-
tween income and wealth of only about .5 in Germany. For the United States,
Keister and Moeller (2000) report a correlation coefficient of only .26 when fi-
nancial assets are excluded and .5 when they are added. Brzozowski et al. (2010)
calculated a correlation of .4 for Canada.
There are several reasons why wealth is a more appropriate measure for the
overall economic well-being of individuals and households than income. Take the
example of somebody who does not earn any income for a given period because
of unemployment or illness. If income were the only indicator for economic well-
being, this person would be assumed to be poor. Yet, if the same person has
access to wealth to compensate her lack of income, this interpretation would be
wrong (Elmelech, 2008). So, we have to take into account not only income, but
also wealth. Moreover, income poverty often may only last for shorter periods
of time in a job career, whereas poverty in wealth tends to be a long-term state
in the life course (ibid.). Nonetheless, finding a clear distinction between wealth
and income remains a challenging task.
The definition of wealth in empirical studies also depends strongly on which
components of wealth have been measured in a study. The literature reveals
a strong agreement that wealth can be characterized by three major aspects
which distinguish it considerably from income (e. g. Claupein, 1990; Jenkins,
1990; Ring, 2000). First, wealth is a stock figure, whereas income is a flow
figure. In other words, income can be captured only in relation to a period of
time (e.g., per hour, month, year), whereas wealth is meaningful without being
bound to a special period of time (Augustin and Sanga, 2002, p. 15).
The second aspect is the functions of wealth. In contrast to income that
can be saved or consumed, wealth is far more versatile. For instance, it can
function as income, mostly in the form of earned interest or dividends, and it
can have a utility function derived from the personal use of nonfinancial as-
sets, for example, when enjoying a ride on one’s motorbike or looking at one’s
art collection. Wealth also has a security function and can serve as a buffer
against income losses. It further has a power function because it can be used
to assert one’s will against that of others (Weber, 1984). Wealth additionally
allows one to define and maintain a specific social status and prestige (func-
tion of social maintenance) and finance the upbringing and education of one’s
children (socialization function). Finally, in contrast to income, wealth can be
used to secure the economic well-being of the next generation via inheritance
(inheritance function) (Ring, 2000; Frick and Grabka, 2009).
The third major difference between wealth and income is more “technical”:
the difficulties in measuring it. Whereas income can be measured quite easily
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by asking for (gross and net) earnings, assessing a person’s wealth is far more
demanding. For example, in case of real assets (e.g., real estate or cars) one
can distinguish between their original value, their replacement value, their net
value, or their market value. Of course, which of these values are used to
estimate assets depends strongly on the research question.
Most existing studies (Christelis et al., 2005; Claus and Scobie, 2001; Kessler
and Wolff, 1991) have distinguished between two types of wealth: nonfinancial
assets and financial assets. Nonfinancial assets can be differentiated further
into consumptive assets4 and productive assets5. Financial assets are defined
as the value debt claim minus liabilities (Ring, 2000). Finally, net worth is
defined as the value of total assets (financial assets plus real assets) minus the
total liabilities of an economic entity (cf. Claus and Scobie, 2001; Keister and
Moeller, 2000). This last definition also used by SHARE and in the present
article. Finally, it is important to distinguish between private (family) and
public wealth; this study refers only to the former.
Empirical analyses of income and income inequality usually take the individ-
ual as the unit of analysis. For our purpose, the family or the household seems
more appropriate, although individuals are the entities generating wealth. Many
scholars (e. g. Barber, 1957; Spilerman, 2000) have argued that the family as a
social institution is a major determinant of the cultural, social, and economic
status of its members. Therefore, the family has a central meaning for a soci-
ety’s social stratification. Furthermore, families or marital households can be
understood as production facilities of individual benefit (cf. Becker, 1976). Mar-
ried couples, for example, but also couples living in a steady relationship, often
share their assets. If they have children, one can reasonably assume that they
share their assets with their children as well.
3 Explaining differences in the distribution of
wealth among households in Europe
Undoubtedly, individual and household characteristics strongly influence wealth
accumulation processes. For example, in their well-known “life-cycle hypothe-
sis”, Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) assume a direct relation between age and
wealth. In times of employment, meaning at younger ages, individuals tend to
save their income (positive saving rate) in order to consume it during their times
of retirement up to death (negative saving rate or “dissaving”). The expected
4Consumptive assets cover commodities and consumer goods as well as real estates of
private households.
5In contrast to consumptive assets, productive assets allow the realization of profits and
income.
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outcome would thus be a hump-shaped wealth profile. Nonetheless, empiri-
cal studies (Menchik and David, 1983; Poterba, 1994) have found repeatedly
that dissaving in retirement is much lower than predicted, whereas it is the
inheritance motive that is more important. Of course, further factors on the
individual level – such as migration background, gender, household type, health
– can also exert a strong influence on the accumulation of wealth in the life
course. However, numerous researchers have assumed that age6 and inheritance
are the most influential ones (e. g. Azpitarte, 2008; Brandolini et al., 2004;
Danziger et al., 1982; Semyonov and Lewin-Epstein, 2011; Spilerman, 2000).
Due to the age pattern of the SHARE population mean wealth values should be
rather high compared to the whole population as households already had time
to accumulate assets.
Individual and household determinants are beyond the scope of this study.
Our central interest is to understand how household wealth is distributed in
European countries, to study the emergence of systematic patterns of wealth
inequalities, and to see whether regime-specific patterns resemble the picture
painted so far in international comparative research on social inequality. Over
the past decades, research has shown that national institutional settings strongly
shape social inequality structures (e.g. Blossfeld et al., 2009; DiPrete et al.,
1997; Shavit et al., 2007). Because they mold the process of income and wealth
accumulation over the life course, economic and institutional contexts as well
as governmental instruments can be regarded as central driving forces for the
social stratification of a society.
Classifying countries into distinct welfare regimes helps us to understand
better the inequality structures in European societies. The most prominent
classification of welfare regimes is without doubt Gosta Esping-Andersen’s three
worlds of welfare capitalism (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 1999), namely the liberal,
conservative, and social democratic welfare states. In recent years, Esping-
Andersen’s typology has been extended by a Southern European welfare regime
(Ferrera, 1996) and a post-socialist welfare regime (e.g. Beyer, 2009; Blossfeld
et al., 2005; Fenger, 2007). This regime classifications are based on three main
categories: (1) the degree of decommodification; (2) the degree of social strat-
ification; and (3) the respective importance of the market, the state, and the
family for the production of individuals’ welfare.
In liberal welfare regimes, individuals take care of their welfare by them-
selves on the (labor) market. Following the idea of “freedom on the highest
6The main respondents of the SHARE study providing data for our analyses are aged 50
years and older. Hence, compared to the average population, households in our study should
dispose of a quite high level of wealth because they have had more time to accumulate it,
their debts are lower because, for example, homes have been paid off, and they have a higher
chance of having already received an inheritance.
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level”, there is hardly any governmental intervention in the market process to
reduce inequalities and to secure individual welfare. This is why the liberal
welfare state is often also called the “workfare state”. All in all, the degree of
decommodification is rather low, and it is the (labor) market which produces
individual welfare. In liberal countries, social inequality is usually high, particu-
larly with respect to income differences (e.g. ?Papatheodorou and Pavlopoulos,
2003).
In contrast, social democratic welfare states have a high level of public com-
mitment to offering equal opportunities and securing individuals’ well-being. In
this regime, the state strongly intervenes in the market process and actively
supports full employment (e.g., through a strong public sector). Additionally,
welfare programs are universalistic and comparatively generous. All in all, gov-
ernments in social democratic welfare states try to realize “equality on the high-
est level” in an overall sense, and they place a strong emphasis on decommodifi-
cation and the reduction of social inequalities (e.g., through progressive taxation
of incomes to reduce income inequalities).
The typical conservative welfare regime has a modest degree of decommodi-
cation. The most important factors in the production of welfare are the market
and the family. Nonetheless, compared to the liberal welfare model, it does pro-
vide welfare programs and public social security systems. However, compared
to the social democratic model of welfare, conservative regimes display a high
level of social stratification instead of a universal social policy ideology. Conse-
quently, the level of social inequalities can be located somewhere in the middle
between liberal and social democratic countries. Indeed, empirical studies (e.g.
?Papatheodorou and Pavlopoulos, 2003) have confirmed a more modest level of
income inequality in countries with this type of welfare regime.
The Southern European welfare regime (Ferrera, 1996) is characterized by
weak public institutions, a high importance of informal work, a comparatively
weak system of social security, strong clientelism, and the assignment of an
outstanding importance to the family and the church in the production of welfare
(Arts and Gelissen, 2002; Ferrera, 1996).
Finally, post-socialist welfare regimes strongly reduced social policy mea-
sures in favor of economic development in the first years after the fall of the
Iron Curtain. In the new millennium, this regime displays very diverse sociopo-
litical ad hoc activity to fight emerging problems such as increasing unemploy-
ment and poverty (Sengoku, 2004). Today, most post-socialist countries have
reached a high level of sociopolitical activity “to meet long-term fiscal and socio-
demographic challenges” (ibid., p. 232). The state has virtually withdrawn from
the sector of public welfare, and an institutionally pluralized welfare sector has
been introduced (ibd.).
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Esping-Andersen’s welfare state typology defines social inequality strongly
in terms of the labor market in at least two ways: first, when analyzing an
individual’s position in the labor market (for the degree of social stratification);
and second, when measuring the degree of an individual’s dependence on the
labor market to maintain his or her livelihood (for the degree of decommodi-
fication). This also becomes visible in the empirical data forming the basis of
his classification. Esping-Andersen’s indicators relate almost exclusively to the
labor market, especially when he measures the degree of social stratification
(Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 58). Consequently, and in line with most contem-
porary research on social inequality and social stratification, he neglects the
central role of wealth and its distribution in the process of social stratification
(cf. Elmelech, 2008, p. 6). This is why the following analyses attempt to study
whether our current understanding of welfare regimes, which is based mostly on
regime-specific differences on the labor market and earned income, also can be
extended to cross-national differences in wealth inequalities in Europe.
Our central hypothesis is that the measured degree of income inequality is
similar to the measured degree of wealth inequality. This means that the level
of inequality in income would be closely related to the level of inequality in
wealth. If that is true, the empirical results of our study should be as follows:
In the liberal welfare states, the government does not intervene in the distri-
bution of income, and, because income is a central source for the accumulation
of wealth, wealth inequalities should also be very pronounced. They should be
intensified further by the almost complete lack of social security systems that
could prevent the level of wealth inequality from becoming too high. On the
other hand, these liberal welfare regimes strongly favor personal provision for
old age via, for example, easy access to mortgages (cf. Elmelech, 2008, p. 75).
In the conservative welfare states instead, we expect to find a modest level of
wealth inequality. In this regime, all households have access to a minimum level
of social security. At the same time, their general welfare and tax ideology is
characterized by high status maintenance and moderate attempts to reduce the
inequalities produced in the labor market. The government strongly protects
families, enabling them to accumulate wealth via lower taxes or special savings
contracts, and it tries to balance social inequalities via progressive income tax.
In the social democratic welfare states, levels of wealth inequality should be
rather low. In these countries, the government strongly tries to reduce income
inequalities by, for example, high taxation of earnings, strong support for gen-
der equality, and comparatively generous welfare state programs. Turning to
Southern European welfare states, we expect wealth inequalities to be rather
high because the government does not so much intervene in order to support
the income poor and to ask the income rich to do more for social solidarity. In
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post-socialist states, the median net worth should be very low, because people
did not have much time to accumulate wealth, and levels of wealth inequali-
ties should be high, also mainly resulting from the socialist transformation (e.g.
Henderson et al., 2004).
However, if we do not find empirical evidence for such a close relationship
between income and wealth in our results, wealth will have to be treated as
distinct dimension of social stratification. This would make it necessary to
reconsider Esping-Andersen’s typology.
4 Data and methods
Data
Our empirical analyses are based on the second wave of the “Survey of Health,
Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE)”. SHARE is an international, repre-
sentative panel study of the population aged 50 years and above. In the second
wave, conducted in 2006/2007, a total of 33,281 persons in the following 13 EU
member states were asked about their financial situation, their social life, and
their health: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands (as conservative
welfare states); Denmark, Sweden (as social democratic welfare states); Switzer-
land (originally as a liberal welfare state but today counted to the conservative
welfare type); Greece, Italy, Spain (as Southern European welfare states); and
the Czech Republic and Poland (as post-socialist welfare states). Respondents
were private persons aged a minimum of 50 years and their spouses (regardless
of their age) living in the same household.
A typical problem with questions addressing financial aspects is a high rate
of item nonresponse (e. g. Riphahn and Serfling, 2005). This applies particularly
to persons at the edges of the distribution (i.e., low and high earners). Loosing
these cases due to missing values increases the risk of ending up with a biased
and probably highly selective sample (Kalwij and van Soest, 2005). The SHARE
team is tackling this problem by applying a multiple imputation strategy for
filling in missing values that was formulated mainly by Rubin (1987). More
precisely, five values are estimated for every missing value. A more detailed
description of the imputation method used in the SHARE study can be found
in Christelis (2011). We analyze two central variables: household net income7
7Total income is the sum of some incomes at the individual level and some at the household
level. The basic definition used in the SHARE project reflects money income after taxes on a
yearly base and includes only regular payments. Lump-sum payments and financial support
provided by parents, relatives or other people are not included. The available data at the
individual level include: income from employment; income from self-employment or work for
a family business; income from (public or private) pensions or invalidity or unemployment
benefits; income from alimony or other private regular payments; income from long-term care
insurance (only for Austria and Germany). The available data at the household level include:
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Table 1: Number of households per country (unweighted)
Country Total Percent Cum.
Austria AT 987 4.34% 4.34%
Germany DE 1,698 7.47% 11.82%
Sweden SE 1,970 8.67% 20.49%
Netherlands NL 1,846 8.12% 28.61%
Spain ES 1,414 6.22% 34.84%
Italy IT 1,888 8.31% 43.15%
France FR 2,060 9.07% 52.21%
Denmark DK 1,759 7.74% 59.95%
Greece GR 2,172 9.56% 69.51%
Switzerland CH 1,076 4.74% 74.25%
Belgium BE 2,137 9.41% 83.65%
Czech Republic CZ 1,943 8.55% 92.21%
Poland PL 1,771 7.79% 100.00%
Total 22,721 100.00%
SHARE Wave 2, release 2.5.0, data unweighted, own calculations.
All analyses based on 5 sets of imputations. See text for details
and household net worth8. In the following, statistical results are calculated
by taking the mean scores across the five datasets. The unit of analysis is the
household, but only one person per household was selected as the main house-
hold respondent. This approach is valid, because the values for the financial
variables are the same for every person living in the same household. The final
dataset contains 22,721 households. Table 1 reports sample sizes per country.
Methods
We shall start by compiling a descriptive overview on the distribution of net
worth among the elderly across European countries using simple measurements
of statistical dispersion. In a second step, we shall calculate rankings and mea-
surements of inequality for both the distribution of income and wealth. We
income from household members not interviewed; income from other payments, such as hous-
ing allowances, child benefits, poverty relief, etc.; income actually received from secondary
homes, holiday homes or real estate, land or forestry; capital income (interest from bank ac-
counts, transaction accounts or saving accounts; interest from government or corporate bonds;
dividend from stocks or shares; interest or dividend from mutual funds or managed investment
accounts). For homeowners, the data at the household level also include imputed rent, based
on the self-assessed home value minus the net residual value of the debt (payments for mort-
gages or loans). The interest rate used for imputed rents is fixed at 4% for all countries. The
SHARE definition of income does not include home business and “other types of debts”: in
the latter case we are not able to separate the amount of the debts on cars and other vehicles
from the total amount of debts (Paccagnella and Weber, 2005).
8Net worth contains: (1) Real assets, i.e. the ownership and value of the primary residence,
of other real estate, of the share owned of own businesses and of owned cars; (2) Gross financial
assets, i.e. the ownership and value of bank accounts, government and corporate bonds,
stocks, mutual funds, individual retirement accounts, contractual savings for housing and life
insurance policies; (3) Mortgages and financial liabilities (Christelis et al., 2005, 358f.).
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shall use different quantiles to rank the distributions: The households are then
ranked according to their net worth and allocated to particular sections of the
distribution. In a case of total equality, every section would share exactly the
same proportion of the population’s total net worth.
The most popular and most frequent way of measuring inequality in the
social sciences is the Gini coefficient (Gini, 1921) which will also be used in this
study. For income (wealth) as a discrete attribute Gini is calculated as follows:
G(y) =
[
1
2n2µ
] n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
|yi − yj | (1)
with inequality measured by the arithmetic average of the absolute difference
between all income (wealth) pairs and standardized by dividing it by the pop-
ulation’s average income (wealth). As a result, the Gini ranges from 0 (total
equality) to 1 (total inequality). The overall inequality within a country is there-
fore defined by the relative position of each household compared to the relative
position of each other household (cf. Milanović, 2005, 98). Gini is influenced
strongly by the most frequently occurring incomes (wealth), because it is sensi-
tive to changes around the median (cf. Grabka, 2000).
Apart from being the best known measure of inequality in social sciences
Gini has a further big advantage for our purpose. That is, it is well defined for
negative and zero values, as long as mean values are greater than one (which is
the case in our study). Income in most cases is positive, but zeroZero net worth
can mean (1) that the household possesses neither any assets nor any liabilities
or (2) that the value of the household’s assets equals the value of its liabilities.
and negative9 values are very likely to appear in a country’s distribution of
wealth.10
Before presenting the results, two further points remain to be discussed:
the use of weights and the use of an equivalence scale. We use cross-sectional
calibrated weights that “are calibrated to precisely reflect each country’s age and
gender proportions” (Börsch-Supan et al., 2005, 21). These weights compensate
for problems of unit nonresponse and sample attrition (cf. Mannheim Research
Institute for the Economics of Aging, 2010)
Equivalence scales assume that each household type in the population has
an assigned value in proportion to its needs. They account for the number of
persons living in a household and for economies of scale. Equivalence scales
are usually applied for income, but regarding wealth, the situation is difficult.
9Negative net worth means that the value of a household’s liabilities is higher than the
value of its assets.
10For net worth, 5.31% of all households had a zero or negative value; for net equivalized
income, this was 1.2%. See Appendix B for an overview on the proportion of households with
zero and negative net worth over countries.
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The literature on the distribution of wealth reveals “no standard or well-defined
approach accounting for different needs” (Sierminska and Smeeding, 2005, 2).
In the present study, we are mainly interested in the access to wealth by house-
holds – that is, household wealth inequality – and not the access to wealth by
individuals within the households – that is, the actual consumption of household
wealth (ibid, 4). Therefore we decided not to use an equivalence scale neither
for household wealth and for reasons of comparability nor for household income.
5 Empirical analyses and results
Comparing wealth and income inequalities across Europe
We first test our central hypothesis that the measured degree of income inequal-
ity will be similar to the measured degree of wealth inequality. We systemat-
ically compare a country’s distribution of income to its distribution of wealth.
Table 2 reports mean and median household net income and net worth across
countries. As can be seen, mean and median net income are highest in Switzer-
land and the Netherlands and relatively low in Poland and the Czech Republic,
followed by Greece and Spain. Comparing mean and median net income also
reveals that income distributions tend to be right-skewed – a quite typical find-
ing (cf. Neal and Rosen, 2000). However, it has to be noted that the differences
between mean and median are rather low. Our results also show that wealth
distributions are more right-skewed than income distributions (see also Davies
and Shorrocks, 2000). The biggest differences between mean and median net
worth emerge in Poland, Sweden, and Switzerland, followed by Denmark – a
rather unexpected result. Mean net worth is highest in Switzerland and France,
whereas median net worth is highest in Belgium. The lowest mean and median
values for net worth are to be found in Poland and the Czech Republic.
In the next step, we investigate the share of total net worth held by different
quantiles of households per country. The results, shown in Table 3, reveal two
things: (1) Net worth seems to be distributed very unequally, and (2) this holds
true for every country in the sample, because the share of total net worth of
the households’ poorest 20% ranges from -1%11 (Switzerland) to only 1% (Italy,
Greece, Belgium).12 Looking at the bottom 50% of the households, these trends
continue and the differences between countries become even larger: The share
of total wealth now ranges from 6% (Poland) to 17% (Belgium). The same
applies for the bottom 90%: The poorest 90% of households share between 38%
(Poland) and 66% (Czech Republic) of total net worth. At this stage of our
11Values can be negative because in this analysis debts are included. In the case of Switzer-
land the poorest 20% of the country’s housholds share a net worth of - 4,925,720 Euros.
12In case of equality in net worth the households poorest 20% should share exactly 20% of
total net worth.
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Table 2: Mean and median household net worth and net income (in 1.000 Euros,
ppp-adjusted, weighted)
Net Income Net Worth
χ¯ χmed
χ¯
χmed
χ¯ χmed
χ¯
χmed
AT 26.95 21.94 1.23 189.44 133.39 1.42
DE 33.12 24.43 1.36 226.01 135.12 1.67
SE 31.98 26.22 1.22 276.61 129.63 2.13
NL 40.65 28.35 1.43 353.22 180.82 1.95
ES 23.69 14.82 1.60 372.78 222.00 1.68
IT 24.25 18.65 1.30 281.32 195.45 1.44
FR 37.61 26.54 1.42 394.54 233.56 1.69
DK 29.56 24.28 1.22 297.42 165.55 1.80
GR 21.04 14.52 1.45 218.14 135.50 1.61
CH 42.23 31.97 1.32 457.03 216.10 2.11
BE 31.80 21.77 1.46 333.99 244.43 1.37
CZ 16.47 13.01 1.27 110.45 77.20 1.43
PL 11.40 8.20 1.39 97.42 37.18 2.62
SHARE Wave 2, release 2.5.0, data weighted, own calculations.
All analyses based on 5 sets of imputations. For abbreviations,
see Table 1.
analyses, it seems to be difficult to find any clear country pattern in the distri-
bution of net worth. This impression becomes even stronger when looking at the
wealthiest households. The greatest inequalities in net worth seem to emerge
in Poland, the Netherlands, and Switzerland in which the households’ richest
10% share more than one-half or even more than two-thirds of the households’
total net worth (54% or 64%) and the richest 5% still share more than or almost
one-half of total net worth (53% or 42%).
Additional measures of distribution are the 90/50- and the 90/10-percentiles.
They relate the lowest wealth margin of the richest 10% of a country’s house-
holds to the upper margin of wealth of the poorest 50% respectively 10% of this
country’s households. The values of the 90/50-percentiles range from 3 (Aus-
tria, Spain, Italy, France, Belgium, Czech Republic) up to 7 (Sweden). This
means that in Sweden, for example, the richest 10% of households exceed the
distribution median seven times. The highest values for the 90/10-percentiles
are found in Denmark and France; the lowest, in Spain and Greece.
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Table 4: Gini for net income (NI) & net worth (NW) (in 1.000 Euros, ppp-
adjusted, weighted)
G(NI) G(NW) GNWGNI
AT .36 .56 1.57
DE .44 .63 1.44
SE .36 .67 1.85
NL .42 .69 1.57
ES .51 .59 1.16
IT .42 .56 1.32
FR .45 .61 1.35
DK .37 .63 1.71
GR .47 .55 1.17
CH .41 .69 1.67
BE .45 .51 1.13
CZ .38 .54 1.42
PL .43 .75 1.71
SHARE Wave 2, release 2.5.0, data
weighted, own calculations. All analyses
based on 5 sets of imputations. For abbre-
viations, see Table 1.
Table 4 reports Gini (G) coefficients for net worth and net income as well as
the ratios for Gini of net worth and net income. The lowest Gini coefficients for
income inequality emerge in Austria, Sweden, Denmark, and the Czech Repub-
lic. The highest Gini coefficients for income inequality appear in Spain followed
by Greece. These trends are in line with the trends in income inequality for the
overall population in the analyzed countries shown in Table 5 (Appendix A),
although income inequality seems to have increased over time. For net worth,
the data show the lowest Gini coefficients in Belgium, the Czech Republic, and
Greece. The highest wealth inequalities according to the Gini Index emerge in
Poland followed by the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland. Finally, analyz-
ing the ratios for net income and net worth, in other words, the discrepancies
between inequality in income and net worth, we can state, first of all, that, in
line with recent research in all countries, the level of wealth inequality exceeds
the level of income inequality (all ratios are greater than one). The biggest
discrepancies are to be found in Sweden, Denmark an Poland.
Classifying wealth and income inequalities in Europe
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate these findings in scatterplots. Whereas Figure 1 dis-
plays the grouping of countries as we expect it to be, according to our theoretical
reasoning and hypothesis, Figure 2 contains our actual findings. In both figures
the x-axis represents the Gini Index for net worth; the y-axis for net income.
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Figure 1: Scatterplot - Expected Gini coefficients for net income and net worth
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SHARE Wave 2, release 2.5.0, data weighted, own calculations. All analyses based on 5 sets
of imputations. For abbreviations, see Table 1.
The thick lines are the median levels of inequality in net worth (y-axis) and net
income (x-axis) over all countries. They span a coordinate system with four
quadrants. Looking at the scatterplots, we can first state that the expected
(Figure 1) and actual (Figure 2) groupings of countries differ a lot. Accord-
ing to our main hypothesis the levels of income and wealth inequality should
be similar within the different countries. This would mean, that the Southern
European welfare states should cluster in the quadrant with both income and
wealth inequalities above the median level, whereas the social democratic welfare
states should be located in the opposite quadrant with both levels of inequality
below the median level. The conservative welfare states finally should cluster
around the median levels of income and wealth inequality. For the post-socialist
countries we did not have any clear predictions.
Looking at Figure 2 our expectations are only fulfilled for two countries.
These are France and Germany, two conservative welfare state representatives,
that indeed cluster around the median levels of income and wealth inequality.
Apart from this, we find a pattern that is very different from our expectations.
The countries are spread evenly over all quadrants. For income inequality, the
median Gini coefficient is .42 and for wealth inequality it is .61. As expected, the
median level of wealth inequality exceeds the median level of income inequality
for all countries studied.
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Figure 2: Scatterplot - Actual Gini Coefficients for net income and net worth
AT
DE
SE
NL
ES
IT
FR
DK
GR
CH
BE
CZ
PL
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80
G
in
i 
N
e
t 
In
co
m
e
Gini Net Worth
SHARE Wave 2, release 2.5.0, data weighted, own calculations. All analyses based on 5 sets
of imputations. For abbreviations, see Table 1.
Located in the quadrant where we expected to find the Southern European
welfare states, we actually find Poland (post-socialist welfare state) and the
Netherlands (conservative welfare state), whereas the latter one is still located
close to the median levels of income and wealth inequalities. In the quadrant
where the social democratic welfare states were expected to cluster, we surpris-
ingly find the Czech Republic (post-socialist welfare state) and Austria but also
Italy, though located close to the median lines for income and wealth inequali-
ties. We also find countries in the quadrant with income inequality above and
wealth inequality below the median level. These are the Southern European
welfare states Greece and Spain (as an outlier with by far the highest level of
income inequality) but also Belgium (conservative welfare state). Finally, and
most surprising to us, we find the two social democratic welfare states Sweden
and Denmark to cluster in the quadrant with low levels of income inequality but
high levels of wealth inequality. Located in the same quadrant is also Switzer-
land, that today is seen as a representative for the conservative type of welfare
states.
In sum, there is one robust clear-cut relationship between a country’s wealth
distribution and its type of welfare state: Wealth inequalities are surprisingly
high in the social democratic welfare states known for their high level of egalitar-
ianism. Our classification contains several unexpected findings that run counter
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to our current understanding of welfare regimes, mostly based on regime-specific
differences on the labor market and earned income. Rather surprisingly, the
Czech Republic and Poland are located far apart, with very low levels of income
and wealth inequality in the Czech Republic and very high ones in Poland. Sen-
goku (2004) offers one hint that might explain these different levels of income
inequality found in the two post-socialist welfare type countries: “[...] while the
welfare systems of the Czech Republic have kept some characteristics of the uni-
versal, social democratic model, in Poland social-policy institutions with liberal
characteristics have been gradually introduced in recent years” (p. 237).
However, the most unexpected finding is the high levels of wealth inequality
in the social democratic welfare states Sweden and Denmark. Up to now, the
social democratic regime has been described as aiming toward reducing social
inequalities. While these welfare states are apparently relatively successful in
reducing income inequalities (flow data), for example, by progressive taxation
of earnings and comparatively generous welfare state programs, they are less
successful in reducing wealth inequalities. Perhaps it is even these countries’
attempts to reduce income inequalities that cause a comparatively high level of
wealth inequality: On the one hand, the strong public equalization of income via
taxation hinders the accumulation of wealth. This systematically reduces the
chances of improving one’s situation and achieving upward mobility in wealth.
On the other hand, those who are wealthy in these countries pay hardly any
additional taxes and this systematically reduces downward mobility in the very
rich. Thus, a paradoxical result of the equalizing income and labor market
policies in the social democratic regime would seem to be strong and persistent
wealth inequalities.
Another mechanism that might explain this unexpected finding is that a
large part of the population may strongly rely on the social security system in
these countries. The individuals do not consider it necessary or important to
accumulate wealth, because the government will care for them if they get ill and
when they retire. Feldstein (1974) published a popular study claiming that so-
cial security reduces personal savings by even 30 to 50%. But this “sensational”
result was disproved some years later by Leimer and Lesnoy (1982) who showed
that a high level of social security can lead to both reduced and increased per-
sonal savings. One study supporting our finding, especially for Sweden, was
carried out by Roine and Waldenström (2009): They have reported that the
wealth concentration in Sweden increased dramatically after 1980, due to “Swe-
den’s financial liberalization in 1989” (p. 170) together with “dramatic increases
in stock returns at the Stockholm Stock Exchange between 1980 and 2000” (p.
169). Because of the high taxation of wealth (until 2008) and the reduced costs
of “avoiding wealth taxes by moving wealth abroad” (p. 171), many Swedes
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began to hold their wealth in foreign countries. Another reason for the high
concentration of wealth in Sweden may be that a large proportion of Swedish
wealth is held by a few family firms. Whatever the case, most studies on wealth
inequalities do not report this dramatic increase in Swedish wealth inequality.
This is because they generally work with data from official tax statistics that
capture neither foreign wealth nor the wealth of family firms (because of their
entrepreneurial activity, they pay only low taxes). Because the SHARE data
is survey data, it is quite plausible that, in contrast to other studies, we find
a higher level of wealth inequality in Sweden. And this may also account for
the high level of wealth inequality in Denmark. A look at the composition of
net worth in the countries analyzed (see Appendix C) supports our assumption.
Denmark shows the highest proportion of financial assets on total net worth
(32%). In Sweden, the percentage of financial assets amounts to 24% – a rather
high proportion as well.
No clear pattern can be found for either the conservative or the Southern
European welfare states. In sum, our main result is that the wealth inequality
situation is not similar to the income inequality situation among the elderly in
Europe, and that Esping-Andersen’s typology cannot account for the distribu-
tion of wealth. We found no clear empirical evidence for our main hypothesis
that the measured degree of income inequality would be similar to the measured
degree of wealth inequality.
6 Summary and outlook
In this contribution, we have tried to shed light on some questions that are
still relatively unexplored, namely, how is wealth distributed among the elderly
across Europe, and does Esping-Andersen’s typology of welfare states provide
an appropriate explanation for not only the distribution of income but also the
distribution of wealth in modern societies. The main findings are: (1) The
distribution of net worth varies strongly between different European countries;
and (2) patterns in wealth inequality (stock data) across European countries
differ strongly from patterns of social inequality (flow data) derived from labor
market processes. Most surprisingly, there are very high levels of wealth dis-
parity in the social democratic welfare regime that is commonly described as
being marked by a high level of egalitarianism. Hence, our hypothesis that the
measured degree of income inequality will be similar to the measured degree of
wealth inequality has to be rejected.
Esping-Andersen’s welfare regime typology is unable to capture the unequal
distribution of net worth in different European societies. Indeed, our results
suggest that his classification is a very one-sided approach relying strongly on
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only one source of social stratification, that is, “one’s position in the production
system, as reflected by labor market outcomes” (Semyonov and Lewin-Epstein
2011, 935). In contrast to the distribution of income, however, the distribution
of wealth in Europe seems to require the consideration of other mechanisms
than the individuals’ positions in the production system. This also supports
the assumption that wealth has to be treated as separate dimension of social
stratification. Especially in light of the growing importance of wealth as an
income substitute in older age and during retirement, stratification research
should study wealth inequalities in order to gain an appropriate understanding
of the “real” level of social inequalities in modern societies. In our view, it would
be promising for future research to focus on in-depth country-specific analyses
in order to find out more about the mechanisms generating wealth inequalities
and to better understand the distinct connection between income and wealth in
different countries. A central question for future research is whether net worth
is generated mainly via personal income or via inheritance, and whether this
also reveals differences between countries. In sum, we claim that our study pro-
vides a good overview on the distribution of wealth among the elderly in Europe
and could show not only that the degree of wealth inequality varies strongly be-
tween the analyzed European countries but also that one should be cautious
about making any direct inferences from a country’s distribution of income to
its distribution of wealth. Our most robust finding is that wealth is distributed
very unequally in the “egalitarian” social democratic welfare countries. Thus,
Esping-Andersen’s typology of welfare regimes has to be reconsidered. Our
study hopefully serves as a good starting point for finding out how wealth is
generated and transmitted within the countries across Europe that will encour-
age further research on the living conditions of elderly Europeans.
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A Appendix
Table 5: Gini for equivalized household net income (total population)
OECD Eurostat World Bank
Gini Year Gini Year Gini Year
OECD total 0.31 mid-2000s - - - -
EU-15 - - 0.30 2008 - -
EU-25 - - 0.30 2008 - -
AT 0.27 mid-2000s 0.26 2008 0.29 2000
DE 0.30 mid-2000s 0.30 2008 0.28 2000
SE 0.23 mid-2000s 0.24 2008 0.25 2000
NL 0.27 mid-2000s 0.28 2008 0.31 1999
ES 0.32 mid-2000s 0.31 2008 0.35 2000
IT 0.35 mid-2000s 0.31 2008 0.36 2000
FR 0.28 mid-2000s 0.28 2008 0.33 1995
DK 0.23 mid-2000s 0.25 2008 0.25 1997
GR 0.32 mid-2000s 0.33 2008 0.34 2000
CH 0.28 mid-2000s - - 0.34 2000
BE 0.27 mid-2000s 0.28 2008 0.33 2000
CZ 0.27 mid-2000s 0.25 2008 0.26 1996
PL 0.37 mid-2000s 0.32 2008 0.33 2000
Sources: Eurostat (2010); OECD (2010); World Bank (2010).
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B Appendix
Figure 3: Percentage of households with zero or negative net worth over coun-
tries (in 1.000 Euros, ppp-adjusted, weighted)
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SHARE Wave 2, release 2.5.0, data weighted, own calculations.
All analyses based on 5 sets of imputations. For abbreviations, see Table 1.
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C Appendix
Figure 4: Composition of net worth across countries (in 1.000 Euros, ppp-
adjusted, weighted)
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